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Essay:
From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: the Development of an
Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law
Jane C. Ginsburg*
A radical change looms in the way we apprehend and enjoy works of
authorship. For all the transformations in the history of the production and
communication of works that technological advances have wrought by making
them more plentiful and less expensive, this change is different. From Gutenberg
to the photocopier and videotape, prior developments had facilitated, indeed
promoted, the acquisition of physical copies of works. At first, only publishers
and pirates employed the new copying technologies. Intermediaries controlled
the means of making and disseminating copies, because the mechanisms for
copying and distributing entire works generally exceeded the financial and
technical capacities of end-users. As a result, until now, perhaps the most
significant post-printing press technological event for copyright law was the
development of mass market audio- and then video-copying devices, because
these devices enabled end-users to create physical copies out of previously
ephemeral radio and television transmissions. These devices gave consumers the
power to “materialize” copyrighted works that had been made available to the
public through means that had previously remained solely within the copyright
owner’s control. Indeed, U.S. copyright law had long distinguished between
public performances, including transmissions, and “publication,” on the ground
that only the latter involved a public distribution of copies through which the
copyright owner lost control over disposition of the work.1 Mass market audio
and audiovisual recording devices thus began to call into question this long
standing distinction.
Digital media made the distinction even more dubious, because any
digital transmission received in a computer would effect a copy at least in
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temporary memory, even if no copy were retained.2 More important, digital
media and communications made it even easier for consumers to create physical
copies of any kind of work, whether previously fixed in a hard copy such as CD
ROM, or received from a transmission, such as an Internet download. Thus,
while digital media in one sense de-materialized copies, by instantly, albeit
intangibly, converting any work into a series of 1s and 0s available for receipt in
RAM, recipients not only could perceive the works fleetingly in “real” time, but
they also held the power to re-materialize them into retention copies, whether
printed, engraved on a CD ROM, or stored to hard disk.
Now, however, the moment of the material copy may be passing. The
technological balance of control over hard copies, having swung toward
empowering end-users, appears to be reverting to copyright owners. Every act
of perception or of materialization of a digital copy requires a prior act of access.
And if the copyright owner can control access, she can condition how a user
apprehends the work, and whether a user may make any further copy. Access
control can at the same time thus vastly increase the availability of copyrighted
works in de-materialized form, yet constrain their susceptibility to conversion to
physical copies. In the impending era of digital access, we will be able to
download anything, whenever, and wherever we want. As a result, we will no
longer need hard copies to enjoy the work; indeed, in a world of access
conditioned on non retention of digital of copies, we will be able to summon up
the work at any time, but we may not be able to have our own copy. Does that
mean we will no longer want copies? And, more broadly, what are the
consequences of these developments for copyright law?
Until now, a great deal of the enjoyment of works of authorship was
possessive and tactile. Many of us liked acquiring works (including unauthorized
private copies); we liked having them; and we liked touching them, even if we
rarely, if ever, in fact read, viewed, or listened to them. None of this matters
when we apprehend a work through digital access. The only reason to access a
work, when one can’t retain a copy, is to read, look at, or listen to it
immediately. For those whose relationship to works of authorship is businesslike, unsentimental, and centered on immediate experience, the disappearance of
hard copies may be liberating. For the more romantically, or at least the more
acquisitively, inclined, the reaction may be more desolate. In either event, the
shift from hard to evanescent copies is recasting copyright law in ways some may
find exhilarating, and others frightening.
This Essay addresses how current U.S. copyright law responds to new
forms of distribution of copyrighted works, through the emerging right to control
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On the doctrine of RAM copying, see infra, TAN and note 20.
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digital access to copyrighted works, as set out in the 1998 Digital Millennium
Copyright Act.3 With respect to the access right, I contend that when the
exploitation of works shifts from having copies to directly experiencing the
content of the work, the author’s ability to control access becomes crucial.
More broadly, I suggest that, in the digital environment, the “exclusive Right” that
the Constitution authorizes Congress to secure to authors4 is not only a “copy”right, but an access right, and I explore the implications of that claim. I do not
contend that the access right will or should supplant “copy”-right. On the
contrary, my claim is that the access right is an integral part of copyright, and
therefore should be subject to exceptions and limitations analogous to those that
constrain “copy”-right. I also acknowledge that there will still be some among us
for whom direct experience affords imperfect enjoyment of works of authorship,
for whom “having” may be even more gratifying than “experiencing.” Just as a
21st-century copyright regime that did not regulate access would be unrealistic
and incomplete, so too a regime that assumes, or directs, that all forms of
exploitation will be intangible may discourage the dissemination of hard copies
(or hard copy-able versions), and by limiting all availability to works to the
copyright owner’s terms, thereby undermine the “progress of Science” that the
Constitution’s provision for the author’s “exclusive Right” is intended to promote.
Copyright Without Hard Copies
It is the near-future. I am jogging along a tropical beach, or traveling
across Europe by train, or sitting at my desk at home in New York; wherever I
am, I have my palm-sized book reader-audio player-satellite cell phone that
permits instant access through digital networks to an infinite variety of literary and
musical works, with payment automatically charged to or debited from my
account. At any moment, from any place, I can read or listen to any work I
want. Moreover, with instant access to audio and video streamed works, hard
copies need no longer encumber my home or briefcase. On the other hand,
instant gratification may not always suffice: sometimes I may wish to annotate my
copy, and retain those reflections. No problem: for a slightly higher fee, I am
allowed one digital retention copy for note-taking, but I may not further
reproduce that copy. Or, for a yet a higher fee, I can make a single placeshifting copy to put in a portable player, for the rare times when Internet access

3
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U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8 cl. 8 (“Congress shall have power . . . to promote the progress
of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writing s and discoveries.”).
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fails. And so on.
These kinds of distribution arrangements are likely only when copyright
owners are confident that the “experiencing” copy will not turn into an
unauthorized “having” copy, or worse yet, unauthorized sharing copies. Of
course, every “experiencing” transaction will involve a simple click-on license,
whose terms make clear the limits of the end-user’s enjoyment.5 But, for
copyright owners, something more, and preferably self-executing, is also needed
to deter consumer cheating. Hence the role of technological protection
measures, from access barriers to anti-copying controls. Copyright owners
nonetheless fear that these measures may prove futile, if no legal impediment
exists to offering devices or services designed to circumvent the technological
protections.6 Hence, the provisions of the 1998 “Digital Millennium Copyright
Act” [DMCA] prohibiting both the act of circumventing access controls, and the
provision of devices or services designed to circumvent either access or anti
copying controls.7
Several commentators have recognized that the DMCA’s provisions on

5

The enforceability of these licenses against non commercial end-users is uncertain.
Cf. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)(shrink wrap license enforced against
commercial user); Maureen O’Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code for
Electronic Commerce or Racing Towards Nonconformity?, 14 BERKELEY T ECH. L. J. 635
(1999); Garry L.Founds, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or not 2B?, 52 FED.
COMM. L. J. 99 (1999); J.H. Reichman and Jo hnathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated
Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of
Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1999).
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act [UCITA] would validate mass
market click-on licenses when the end-user assented to terms that she had the opportunity to
view. See arts. 112, 202, 203, 211. UCITA has been enacted in Virginia, see 2000 Va. H.B. 561
(SN) and 2000 Va. S.B. 372 (SN).
6

Recently filed anti-circumvention claims suggest that these concerns are warranted.
See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 2000 WL 48514 *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(preliminary injunction entered 1/21/00 against websites posting “De-CSS” software to
neutralize DVD access-controls); RealNetworks v. Streambox, 2000 W L 141196 * (W.D. Wash.
2000)(preliminary injunction entered 1/18/00 against device converting streamed audio signal
from an uncopiable format into a signal that may be copied).
7

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(b). See also European Commission, Amended Proposal for
a European Parliament and Council Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of
copyright and relate d rights in the Information Society (COM 1999 250 final 97/0359/COD)
(May 21, 1999) [hereafter “Draft Information Society Directive], art. 6(2) (prohibiting
dissemination of devices designed to circumvent access controls). Compare WIPO Copyright
Treaty [WCT], art. 11, obliging member states to protect against “the circumvention of
effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of
their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention . . .” Neither the WCT nor the Berne
Convention clearly articulate a right to control access.

-4-

circumvention of access protections in effect create a new right under, or perhaps
over, copyright: the right to control access to copyrighted works.8 A notable
lack of enthusiasm for this development often characterizes those comments.9
Some criticisms express the principle that it is highly undesirable for the law to
suppress technology by prohibiting the manufacture and dissemination of anti
circumvention devices.10 Others object to the increase in copyright owners’
power that control of access engenders, and to the consequent shift in the
balance of copyright owner/user rights.11 On the other hand, these
commentators generally do not acknowledge that the “copyright balance” is
hardly immutable: the development and distribution of mass market copying
devices also shifted the copyright “balance” – in that case away from copyright
owners and toward end-users.12 It is far from apparent why the “balance” in
force from the advent of these devices should be more normative and less
contingent than the prior “balance,” or than the now emerging balance. Before
further addressing these concerns, however, it is appropriate first to consider the
nature of the access right, and its place in U.S. copyright law.
Bases for the Access Right
In the beginning — that is, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries —
copyright in most countries was divided into two rights: reproduction and public

See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23
COLUM.-VLA J. L. & THE A RTS 137, 140-43, 147-48 (1999); Kamiel J. Koelman, A Hard Nut to
Crack: The Protection of Technological Measures, Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law
(1999).
8

See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why
the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY T ECH. L. J. 519 (1999);
Jonathan Band & Taro Issihiki, The New Anti-Circumvention Provisions in the Copyright Act:
A Flawed First Step, 3 CYBER. LAW . 2 (1999).
9

10

See e.g. Samuelson, supra note 9 at 557.

See e.g. Julie H. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and
Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY T ECH. L. J. 161 (1997); Julie H. Cohen, A Right
to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at Copyright Management in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 981 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 519 (1999). But see Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of
Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C.L. REV. 557 (1998)
(favoring the development of pay-per-view/listen systems).
11

See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 217 (1996).
12
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performance.13 This division reflected the kinds of exploitations to which
copyrighted works were then subject: reproduction in copies for public
distribution, and performances of works in places open to the public. As time
and techniques evolved, the concept of a public performance extended to a
growing list of transmissions and re-transmissions, culminating in the Berne
Convention — the leading multilateral copyright treaty — which became a
morass of specific provisions on public communications with or without wires.14
In 1996, the WIPO Copyright Treaty [WCT] rewove the increasingly disparate
strands into a general right of communication to the public, including to a public
whose members are separated both in time and in space.15 The right now
extends from live theatrical performances to online delivery of individual songs to
individual consumers, thus reflecting the current and future range of exploitations
of this kind. As for the reproduction right, with advances in technology, from
tape recorders to digital media, domestic U.S. and international copyright law
have increasingly recognized that the author’s right to authorize, or at least to be
compensated for, the making of copies extends not only to one who makes
multiple copies for public distribution, but to end-users who make individual
copies for private consumption.16
What, then, is or should be the relationship of this evolution to “access”
and its place in the U.S. copyright scheme? First, one might inquire whether
“access” falls within the modern conception of either the right of communication
to the public (still called the right of “public performance” in the U.S.), or the
reproduction right. Second, whatever the “fit” of “access” with these older
formulations, does an access right belong in a copyright regime? To answer that

13

See e.g., France, law of Jan. 15, 1791 (public performance right); law of July 21, 1793
(reproduction right); U.K. 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (reproduction right); Dramatic Copyright Act
1833 (public performance right in dramatic works); U.S. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124
(reproduction right); Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (public performance right in
dramatic works).
14

See Berne Convention, arts. 11, 11bis, 11ter.

15

See WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 8; cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definit ion of public
performance).
16

See, e.g., Germany, Law dealing with copyright and related rights, art. 27(1)-(3)
(originally enacted in 1965)(levies for private audio and video taping); France, Code of
intellectual property, art. L. 311-1 - 311-8 (originally enacted in 1985) (same); Spain, Revised law
on intellectual property, regularizing, clarifying and harmonizing the applicable statutory
provisions, art. 25 (originally enacted in 1987) (same); U.S. 1992 Audio Home Recording Act,
17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-1007 (levies for digital audio private copying); Draft Information Society
Directive, art. 5 (requiring “equitable compensation” for private copying, and anticipating the
supplanting of digital private copying by technological protections).
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question, we must consider what copyright should look like in the digital online
environment.
By an “access” right, I mean the right to control the manner in which
members of the public apprehend the work. The concept is distinct from
reproduction or communication to the public to the extent that I may
communicate a copy of my work to the user’s hard drive, or the user may
purchase a digital copy such as a CD ROM, but the user may not “open” the
work to apprehend (listen to, view) its contents, unless the user acquires the
“key” to the work.17 And the key may vary with the nature and extent of
enjoyment of the work. As part of my control over “access,” I may, depending
upon the price the user pays, limit listening or viewing by number of plays, by
number of computers on which the work may be played, by duration of access,
and so on. By contrast, neither traditional reproduction nor public performance
rights would have reached much of this conduct. For example, the “public”
performance right does not extend to private enjoyment of a performance that
the user generates (as opposed to receives from a transmission), such as by
listening to a portable audio disk player.18 The reproduction right, and its
corollary, the distribution right, gave the copyright owner control over the making
and dissemination of copies, but once a particular copy was sold, the copyright
law did not constrain the purchaser’s further disposition of that copy. 19
Nonetheless, the seeds of an access right can be found in pre-Internet
copyright law. For example, the doctrine of RAM copying — which holds that a
“copy” is made when the work is received in a computer’s temporary memory20

17

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (definition of technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work).
18

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definitions of “performance” and “perform publicly”)

19

See id. §§ 106(3), 109(a) (distribution right; “first sale” limitation on distribution

right)
20

It is by now well established in U.S. copyright law that entry of a work into a
computer’s random access memory constitutes making a copy. Hence the need to exempt
certain RAM copies from liability for infringement, see 17 U.S.C. § 117. See Trotter Hardy,
Computer Ram “Copies”: A Hit or a Myth? Historical Perspectives on Caching as a
Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 423, 455 (1997); Michael E.
Johnson, The Uncertain Future of Computer Software: Users’ Rights in the Aftermath of Mai
Systems, 44 DUKE L. J. 327 (1994); Katrine Levin, Mai v. P e a k : Should Loading Operating
System Software into RAM Constitute Copyright Infringement?, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
649 (1994). But see, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent.
L. J. 29, 42 (1994)(arguing against doctrine of RAM copying).
The RAM copying doctrine is implicit in E.U. copyright law as well, see Software
Directive art. 5 (exempting certain temporary reproductions from liability), Directive 91/250/EC
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— would cover “accessing” a work, since apprehending the work through a
computer requires making at least a temporary copy. Similarly, in the digital era,
extension of the public performance right to cover individual receipt of
transmissions approaches an “access” concept. Indeed, the WCT’s articulation
of the right of communication to the public covers the “making available to the
public . . . in such a way that members of the public may access these works
from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”21 While on its face the
definition puts the access choice in the public’s, not the copyright owner’s hands,
the copyright owner’s ability to control the terms under which access is made
available to the public may be implicit in this formulation.
Even if an “access” right does not precisely correspond to either of the
traditional copyright rights of reproduction or public performance, it does
respond to what is becoming the dominant way in which works are in fact
exploited in the digital online environment. After all, there should be nothing
sacred about the eighteenth- or nineteenth-century classifications of rights under
copyright, in a technological world that would have been utterly inconceivable to
eighteenth-century minds. By contrast, the justifications offered by the
Enlightenment-era framers of copyright policy should still guide us. While
Madison could not have foreseen the Internet, he clearly believed that the private
rights of authors furthered the general public interest in the advancement of
learning,22 and he believed that at a time when printing presses were “growing
much faster even than the population.”23 As a matter of economic incentive to

1991 O.J.(L122) 42. There may be more uncertainty as to whether RAM copying is an
international norm. See WCT, Agreed Statement 1(The reproduction right, as set out in Article
9 of the Berne Convention, and the exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital
environment, in particular to the use of works in digital form. It is understood that the storage
of a protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction within
the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention.”) The ambiguity of the term “storage”
permits arguments that all kinds of copying, including in temporary memory are covered, see,
e.g., Dr. Mihaly Ficsor, Copyright for the Digital Era: The WIPO “Internet” Treaties , 21
COLUM.-VLA J. L. & THE A RTS 197 (1997), as well as the contrary, see e.g. Pamela Samuelson,
The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VIRGINIA J. INT . L. 369, 390-92 (1997).
21

WCT, art. 8 (emphasis supplied).

22

See Federalist 43 (“The public good fully coincides in both cases [patent and
copyright] with the claims of individuals.”).
23

M ICHAEL W ARNER, T HE LETTERS OF THE REPUBLIC : PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC
SPHERE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY A MERICA 32 (1990). Significant technological innovations in
printing, however, postdated The Federalist. See HELMUT L EHMANN-HAUPT, T HE BOOK IN
A MERICA 71 (2d ed. 1951)(industrialization of printing begins with the early nineteenthcentury).

-8-

creativity, as well as the author’s right to the fruits of her intellectual labor,24
copyright should cover the actual exploitation of works of authorship.25 On that
account, one should welcome the access right, new arrival though it might be.26
Indeed, without an access right, it is difficult to see how in a digital era
authors can maintain the “exclusive Right” to their “Writings” that the Constitution
authorizes Congress to “secure.” Even if Congress might qualify the right’s
exclusivity by imposing a variety of compulsory licenses,27 or outright
exemptions,28 it is surely one thing to introduce specific and narrow limitations in
coverage,29 quite another to design a system that pervasively fails to afford
meaningful exclusivity. The latter course would clearly be inconsistent with the
constitutional design.
In the past, Congress has usually, albeit not always swiftly or completely,
adjusted the contours of copyright protection to correspond to the new
technology-driven modes of exploitation. For example, after the advent of cable

24

Both these themes can be found in the constitutional copyright clause, in James
Madison’s brief justification for copyright in Federalist 43, and in other eighteenth-century
documents concerning copyright in the U.S., see generally, Jane Ginsburg, A Tale of Two
Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 T ULANE L. REV. 991
(1990).
25

Not everyone would agree with this proposition. Some would contend that, as a
purely statutory creation, copyright extends only as far as Congress has provided, and that
Congress should not rewrite the copyright laws to increase the statutory grant every time a
new mode of exploitation evolves in order to afford copyright owners the full fruits of markets
that new technologies have created. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in
Copyright’s Image, 22 Dayton L. Rev. 587, 596-98 (1997).
26

Arguably, the access right was implicit in the reproduction and distribution rights
under copyright in the days before mass market copying devices. T h e c o p y r i g h t o w n e r
controlled access by choosing how to make the work available. For a pre-WCT argument for
an access right in English copyright law, see Simon Olswang, Accessright: An Evolutionary
Path for Copyright in the Digital Era? [1995] E.I.P.R. 215.
27

S ee, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d), 115, 118, 119, 122 (compulsory licenses for c a b l e
retransmission, phonorecords, public broacasting, satellite retransmission).
28

See, e.g., id. §§ 107, 108, 110, 121 (exemptions for fair use, library photocopying,
certain public performances, reproductions for the blind and disabled).
29

The fair u s e exception ranges more broadly, but incorporates limiting doctrines
drawn from the constitutional copyright clause, and from the first amendment. See, e.g.,
Rosemont Ents. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and
the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. R EV . 983 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright
Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press? , 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180
(1970).
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retransmissions, and after the Supreme Court’s rulings that the retransmissions
were not a “performance,”30 the 1976 Copyright Act made clear that the act of
performance covered cable retransmissions, although it also imposed a
compulsory license regime on much of the activity.31 In 1995, and again in 1998,
Congress established a digital performance right in sound recordings. Before
these amendments, sound recording copyright owners neither controlled nor
received compensation for transmissions, notably broadcasts, of their works.
Exclusion of sound recordings from the public performance right had been
justified on the ground that radio broadcasts helped sell copies of sound
recordings; no distinct market for transmissions was acknowledged.32 With the
advent of digital transmissions of sound recordings, however, Congress ultimately
recognized the importance of a performance right market for sound recordings, a
recognition that appears to have evolved from Congress’ initial realization that
digital transmissions easily become digital private copies. In the digital
environment, transmissions no longer advertise or enhance sales, they threaten to
replace them. 33 The evolution of an access right is consistent with these earlier
examples of Congressional response to emerging modes of exploitation of
copyrighted works.
As we move to an access-based world of distribution of copyrighted
works, a copyright system that neglected access controls would make copyright
illusory, and in the long run it would disserve consumers. Access controls make
it possible for authors to offer end-users a variety of distinctly-priced options for
enjoyment of copyrighted works. Were delivery of works not secured, novel
forms of distribution would be discouraged, and end-users would continue to be
charged for all uses, whatever the level in fact of their consumption.

See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 392 U.S. 390, 88 S.Ct. 2084
(1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 94 S.Ct. 1129 (1974).
30

31

See 17 U.S.C. § 111.

See e.g. Kamesh Nagarajan, Public Performance Rights in Sound Recordings and
the Threat of Digitalization, 77 J. PAT . & T RADEMARK OFF . SOC ’Y 721, 724-5 (1995).
32

33

For the evolution of the digital performance right in sound recordings, see, e.g., Jane
Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & A RTS
137, 166-70 (1999); Mark J. Plotkin, The Times They Are A Changin’: The Digital Performance
Right in the Sound Recordings Act o f 1995 and the Digital Millenium Copyright Act of
1998, 1 VAND. J. OF ENT . L. & PRACT . 46 (1999).
See also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (mandating inclusion of anticopying technology in analog
video recorders manufactured or distributed after April 28, 2001).
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Exceptions to the Access Right
Even granting that an access right is a Good Thing, is it nonetheless too
much of one, at least as implemented by the DMCA? If an access right helps
“secur[e] to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . Writings. . .,” does the
DMCA secure the right too effectively, too exclusively? Critics have expressed
fear that access controls will foster a digital “lock up” enabling copyright owners
— who will have ceased to make the work available in analog or non protected
digital formats — to restrict all access to works to their (overreaching) terms.34
If, indeed, unprotected hardcopies will disappear, then fair use problems may
arise. On the one hand, the “market failure” genre of fair use should fade away in
a world of perfect price discrimination and direct enforcement of copyright
through access controls.35 On the other hand, access controls may be a measure
too crude to accommodate a variety of non infringing uses, including reproduction
of unprotected information contained within a copyrighted work,36 and
“transformative” fair uses, in which the second author seeks to create an
independent work that comments or otherwise builds on its predecessor.37
Since we are here discussing access controls, and not anti copying
controls, arguably fair use is not an issue, because fair use normally comes into
play only after access to the copy has been lawfully obtained. It may be fair use
to copy from a protected work; it is not fair use to steal the book in order to
copy from it. This epigram, however, may be far too simplistic in the new
millennium. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act establishes legal rights against
circumvention of technological measures controlling access to a work. This is not
the same thing as controlling access to a copy. The following example illustrates
the difference between “access to a work” and “access to a copy of a work.”
Suppose that I download copyrighted songs or documents from an authorized

See, e.g., Julie Cohen, supra note 11; Larry Lessig, supra, note 11.
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On “fair use as market failure,” see the seminal article by the same title by Wendy
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Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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They Seem “Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC ’Y U.S.A. 251
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website. Suppose also that to hear the songs or read the documents, I must
register with the copyright owner, using the modem in my computer. In turn, the
copyright owner communicates a password. A technological measure included in
the download recognizes my password, and my computer. Thenceforth, when I
wish to hear the song or read the document, I must enter my password, and listen
to or view it on the same computer; I cannot use my downloaded copy of the
song or document on another computer.38
By making the authorized download, I have acquired lawful access to a
copy of the work. Section 101 of the U.S. Copyright Act defines “copies” as
“material objects” in which “a work” is fixed. The hard drive (or free-standing
disk) on which the download was received is a material object. But the physical
object “copy” is distinct from the incorporeal “work of authorship” that the copy
embodies,39 and I do not access “the work” until I have entered the password
(from the correct computer). Thus, “access to the work” becomes a repeated
operation; each act of hearing the song or reading the document becomes an act
of “access.” When the DMCA bars circumvention of controls on access to the
“work,” the law, in effect, says that I cannot listen to the song or read the
document without implicating the copyright owner’s access right.
In this light, consider first the implementation of the user right to copy
unprotected information, and second, the implementation of a transformative fair
use privilege. Regarding the de facto protection of information, suppose that the
documents I downloaded were substantially composed of public domain
information, such as judicial opinions, or copyright-expired literary works. §
1201(a) protects technological measures controlling access to a “a work
protected under this title;” the provision does not specify how much of the work
must be “protected under this title;” nor does it distinguish “thin copyright” works
from more creative endeavors. Accordingly, it appears that, so long as the
information provider does not merely encrypt raw public domain documents or
unoriginal listings of information, but instead packages the information with
copyrightable trappings (such as a new introduction, or minimally original
reformatting40), a copyrighted work will result, however scant the covering. This
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It also may mean, at least in theory, that I cannot communicate my password to a
friend or family member to hear the song or read the document on my computer, since the
password protects access to the work, and my disclosure of the password is an act that
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See, e.g., Maljack Productions, Inc. v. UAV Corp ., 964 F. Supp. 1416 (C.D. Cal. 1997),
aff’d on other grounds sub nom Batjack Prods. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d
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suggests that the copyrightable figleaf that a producer affixes to an otherwise
unprotectable work could, as a practical matter, obscure the public domain
nakedness of the compiled information, and thereby insulate the judicial opinions
or copyright-expired poetry from the further access that is a prerequisite to
otherwise lawful copying.
Regarding transformative fair use, suppose that I gain lawful access to a
song on a pay per listen basis, without the right to make a retention copy. Since
(for purposes of the hypothetical) I am also a musicologist, I then decide I would
like to study the song’s harmonic patterns. Unless I have an excellent memory, I
will have to pay at least another listening fee, and, more likely, a listen-and-copyonce fee in order to examine the music. Exercise of my fair use privilege thus may
appear to be more costly in an access-protected world. It seems quite
problematic to require fair users to pay more for the privilege: in theory fair uses
come out of the copyright owner’s pocket, not the user’s.41
On the other
hand, in an access-protected world, fair use could in fact cost less overall than in
the hard copy world. Without the price discrimination that access controls permit,
all consumers of copyrighted works may now be paying for the fair use privileges
of a few: if the work is offered at just one price point, then that price will cover
some anticipated level of unauthorized copying.42 In other words, in the hard
copy world, copyright owners are not necessarily subsidizing fair use, other users
are. Access controls thus can offer a better deal to consumers who do not seek
to make fair uses.
Does this mean that consumers who do wish to make transformative uses
would be worse off than in the hard copy world? Perhaps not, because
exercising fair use in the hard copy world can carry additional costs. To return to
the example of the musicologist, if my first apprehension of the song was over the
radio, I would have to endeavor to hear the song more often, rather than enjoying
the convenience of hearing it on demand; I thus would incur greater non monetary
transactions costs. Exercising fair use might also cost me more money than I

See, e.g. Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in
the “Newtonian” World of On-line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY T ECH. L. J. 115 (1997) (fair use is
a “subsidy” from copyright owners to users). Alternatively, one might contend that fair uses,
since they fall outside the scope of a copyright owner’s rights, were never in the pockets of
copyright owners.
41
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For a recent discussion of the benefits, and problems, of price discrimination in
intellectual property systems, see Wendy Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price
Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998) (defending price
discrimination when employed by a producer who already has an intellectual property
monopoly, such as a copyright, since price discrimination loosens the impact of the monopoly
on users; by contrast, price discrimination is not an excuse for creating a monopoly, in non
copyrightable or non patentable subject matter).
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need spend in an access-controlled environment, since in the hard copy world, I
might need to buy a copy of the full recording, at a price presumably higher than a
copy-once delivery of just one song.
The real problems arise, not when a would-be non infringing user must
pay for initial access, but primarily when she cannot obtain continued access on
reasonable terms. The DMCA anticipates some situations in which continued
access to the work should be available, regardless of the copyright owner’s
goals, and accordingly exempts from the prohibition on circumvention of access
controls a narrow and highly specific list of objectives, including reverse
engineering and encryption research (within the limits set out in the statute).43 The
list, however, is not coextensive with the exceptions to copyright protection set
forth with respect to traditional rights under copyright.44 Another provision of the
DMCA, however, states: “Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses applicable to copyright infringement, including fair use,
under this title.”45 Does this provision introduce a fair use defense to
circumvention of access controls?
At first blush, the answer would be “no,” because the statute makes
access circumvention a violation distinct from copyright infringement.46
Moreover, Congress’ direction to the Librarian of Congress to conduct a
rulemaking inquiry to determine whether noninfringing users of works “are likely
to be adversely affected by the prohibition” on circumvention of access controls,
and accordingly, to publish classes of works that should be exempted from the
prohibition,47 suggests that § 1201(a) does not otherwise permit a fair use
defense. The work is either protected against circumvention of access controls

43

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d)-(j). Most of these exemptions apply only to the act of
circumvention. By and large, the prohibition on manufacture and distribution of devices
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for any purpose other than those explicitly set out in §§ 1201(d)-(j), or it is
exempted; indeterminate defenses, such as the highly contextual fair use privilege,
do not fit in this scheme.
Nonetheless, the syntax of § 1201(c) permits an argument that the phrase
“including fair use,” as set off in commas, modifies not “defenses applicable to
copyright infringement,” but “limitations . . . under this title.” Section 1201 is
“under” Title 17, even if it is not, technically, a provision addressed to copyright
infringement.48 If fair use is a general limitation on rights set out in Title 17,
including, for example, the (technically) extra-copyright right to fix performances
of musical works set out in § 1101,49 then § 1201(c) preserves fair use as to anti
circumvention as well. This argument works if one concludes that fair use is not
merely a statutory rule expressed in § 107 of the Copyright Act, but that it is a
general judge-made rule applicable to rights within the penumbra of copyright, as
well as to other intellectual property rights, including trademarks.50 Congress
codified copyright fair use in § 107, but Congress disavowed any intent to
“freeze” this judge-made doctrine, “especially during a period of rapid
technological change.”51 By the same token, one might contend, Congress did
not intend to limit the development of fair use to rights formally within the
Copyright Act (as opposed to Title 17 in general, or even other statutory
intellectual property rights). Because fair use is a “general equitable defense,”52
courts are likely — given an appropriate fact situation — to seek to apply it to
the new access right by articulating additional, and highly contextual, limitations
on the prohibition on circumvention of access controls.
This does not mean that fair use defenses to circumvention are or should
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be fully coextensive with fair use defenses to traditional copyright violations.
Rather, circumvention defenses should evolve in the context of digital online
distribution; some traditional defenses may remain appropriate, others may not,
but new ones may be needed.53 One appropriate defense may arise in the
context of the “copyrightable figleaf”: when the user seeks to obtain unprotected
information, rather than to copy the protected work. It should be permissible,
once access to a copy of the work has been lawfully obtained, to circumvent any
protection attached to the thin copyright veneer in order to access and copy the
raw information.54
A Fair Access exception for purposes of making a transformative use is,
however, more problematic, because in this case, the user’s claim addresses core
copyrighted works. Nonetheless, the user’s conduct would be privileged were
the work disseminated without access controls. Does the use therefore become
less “fair” when the copyright owner interposes an access control? In fact,
fairness may depend on the nature of the access control: what is the copyright
owner seeking to prohibit? In theory, access controls are designed to protect a
business model based on price discrimination according to intensity of use; they
are not intended to prohibit scholarly or critical examination of the works
themselves. But that may be the result if the user cannot consult or acquire a fairusable copy at a reasonable price, or from a source such as a public library. And
if hard copies and unprotected digital copies do disappear in a brave new payper-access world, then the threat to transformative fair use becomes more than a
paranoid fantasy. 55 In fact, works are likely to remain available in traditional hard
copies and unprotected digital copies, but this Essay takes as its premise the
eventual disappearance of those copies for at least some kinds of works. In that
event, it may become necessary to modify the scope of the § 1201(a) access
right, to continue to provide strong protection against unauthorized initial
acquisition of a copy of a protected work, but to allow for circumvention in order
to engage in fair uses, once the copy has been lawfully acquired.
The access right is, I would contend, a necessary and integral component
53
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of copyright law, despite its formal placement in a separate section of Title 17.
But without an appropriate fair use limitation, the access right under § 1201
becomes more than such a component. It becomes instead an Über-copyright
law, rigid as to specified exceptions, and therefore freed of further inquiry into the
balance of copyright owner rights and user privileges that the fair use doctrine —
and the general structure of copyright law — require.
Postscript: The Hard Copy of the Future
In a world of instant access, the hard copy of the future is likely to look
very much like the hard copy of a relatively distant past. That is, deluxe editions
will persist as attractive objects. Inexpensive mass market versions may
eventually disappear, because their primary value is to convey content, not to
cherish as an object. Online access may ultimately replace hard copies for
content conveyance, but may also, perhaps paradoxically, enhance the appeal of
physical originals and fine multiples. The ubiquity of the content makes its
physical container all the more prized when the tangible medium is attractive in its
own right.
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